The proper use of reason and philosophy in theological discourse rests upon recognition of their place and the limits of their competence. Truth, comments Turretin, cannot be set against truth–rather, one truth may transcend another. Thus truths of sense stand below truths of reason (infra rationem), truths of the intellect in immediate relation to truths of reason (juxta rationem), and truths of faith above those of reason (supra rationem). Once this pattern is recognized and the hierarchy of truth acknowledged, then rational truth can be used in theological discourse: “grace does not destroy nature but perfects it, nor does supernatural revelation abrogate the natural, but cleanses it.”
Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, vol. I, 387.
We maintain…that reason should not be heard when it complains of its incapacity to comprehend the mysteries of faith: for, since it is finite, there is no surprise that many things concerning the infinite cannot be grasped by reason–so that to reject a mystery because it is incomprehensible to reason, is to offend against reason itself. It is in this sense that reason is to be made captive (2 Cor 10:5).
Benedict Pictet, quoted in Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Richard A. Muller, 386.
Truth is one and simple, whether conveyed by theology or by philosophy, and is true consistently wherever it is presented (for indeed the distinction of discipline does not multiply truth). Therefore truth is not contrary to itself whether presented in theology or in philosophy.
Bartholomaus Keckermann, quoted in Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, Richard A. Muller, 385.